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Abstract
Pre-election polls can suffer from survey effects. For instance, individ-
uals taking part in the poll may become more aware of the upcom-
ing election so that they become more inclined to vote. Such effects
cause biases in forecasted outcomes of elections. We propose a simple
methodology that takes such survey effects explicitly into account when
translating poll results into election outcomes. By collecting data both
before and after the election, the survey effects can be estimated and
used as correction factors in later polls. We illustrate our method by
means of a field study with data collected before and after the 2007 re-
gional elections (for ‘Provincial States’) in the Netherlands. Our study
provides empirical evidence of significant positive survey effects with
respect to voter participation, and this effect is the largest for left-wing
voters. That is, surveys seem to motivate left-wing people who oth-
erwise would not have participated in the elections. This means that
both the voter turnout and the number of seats going to left-wing par-
ties may be overestimated by pre-election polls that do not correct for
survey effects.
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1 Introduction
Forecasting voting behavior in democratic elections is of substantial practical
interest. Pre-election polls are popular sources of information in many coun-
tries, and in some cases several agencies are in competition by publishing the
outcomes of political polls on a regular basis. The degree of accuracy of elec-
tion forecasts varies substantially, both among agencies and between different
elections. In The Netherlands, for example, the forecasts of ‘Interview-NSS’,
‘TNS-Nipo’, and ‘Maurice de Hond’ play an important role in the political
discussions before elections. At the regional elections of March 2007, the left-
wing parties gained 38.8% of the votes, which is well below the forecasts of all
three agencies: 42.0% by Interview-NSS, 41.7% by TNS-Nipo, and 42.6% by
Maurice de Hond. In our paper, we investigate some of the possible causes of
such differences between forecasts and actual outcomes.
The fact that election forecasts often do not match well with actual ob-
served outcomes may be caused by several factors. For example, political
sentiments can change in the days that lie between the date of the survey and
the date of the elections. This effect can be reduced by taking polls on a regu-
lar basis, for instance weekly, and by continuing the polls until shortly before
the day of the elections. It may also be that the survey sample is not suffi-
ciently representative or that the survey questions cause certain biases. Some
people may wish not to respond, resulting in non-response bias, and others
may answer incorrectly. Such response bias may be conscious or unconscious,
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for instance, because the respondent commits to the interviewer. These effects
can all be mitigated by a careful design of the survey questionnaire and of the
way the survey is performed.
In this paper, we investigate another possible cause of forecast biases, that
is, that interviewed people may change their voting behavior in response to the
interview. This is called a self-generated validity effect in the psychological and
marketing literature on survey effects, see, for instance, Feldman and Lynch
(1988) and Chandon et al (2005). This means that the survey may affect the
latent intentions and, in turn, the manifest behavior of the respondents. For
instance, the interview can increase the awareness of the respondent for the
upcoming election. Several studies indicate that voter participation may be
overestimated due to survey effects, see, for example, Traugott and Katosh
(1979), Greenwald et al (1987) and Granberg and Holmberg (1992). It is im-
portant to take such psychological effects into account, as they influence the
outcomes of opinion polls. The very act of surveying causes automatically
that the survey group is not representative, as the people in the survey are
subjected to psychological effects that are not present in the rest of the popu-
lation. This implies that the survey outcomes can not be extrapolated to the
population in a straightforward way.
Basically, there are two possible solutions. The first is to try to construct
questionnaires that have a minimal psychological impact on subsequent behav-
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ior. We refer to Belli et al (1999) and Brian et al (2007) for contributions on
survey question wording that reduce the bias in self-reported voting behavior.
A second way, which we will adopt in this paper, is to estimate the survey ef-
fects and to use these as correction factors to adjust the outcomes in the survey.
The primary goal of this paper is to investigate the magnitude of self-
generated validity effects in political opinion polls. This is analyzed by a
field study concerning the March 2007 regional elections in The Netherlands,
the elections of the so-called ‘Provincial States’. The survey effects are mea-
sured by collecting data from two groups, a survey group and a control group.
People in the survey group are interviewed twice, both before and after the
elections. The first interview is face-to-face, and the second is done by tele-
phone or e-mail. People in the control group are interviewed only after the
elections, by means of a face-to-face interview, so that they are not influenced
in their voting decision. The interview questionnaires ask for information on
several control variables, including previous political choice, voting intentions,
and socioeconomic and demographic background. This information is used
to estimate survey effects, in particular, whether voter turnout increases and
voter choice changes due to participating in the survey. The obtained correc-
tion factors can be used in future polls to get more reliable forecasts of actual
election outcomes. This may be of interest, for example, for agencies involved
in political polls as well as for political journalists and campaign managers.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and pro-
vides details on the method of data collection. Section 3 discusses the em-
ployed models, consisting of a binary probit model to predict voter turnout
and a multinomial logit model for party choice (left-wing, right-wing, or other,
including the decision not to vote). Section 4 presents the results, including
estimates of the survey effects on participation rates and on party choice.
Section 5 concludes with a summary of our findings and with some further
research topics.
2 Data
2.1 Design of field study
To investigate the potential effects of surveys on people’s voting decisions, we
performed a field study concerning regional elections in the Netherlands at
March 7, 2007, to elect members of the so-called ‘Provincial States’. Some
days before the election, we performed our first survey. Respondents were
asked to answer a list of questions on their political interests, their voting de-
cisions at previous elections, their inclination to participate in the upcoming
elections, and some personal questions on age, education, income, and work.
In our analysis, we focus on modelling two voting decisions: whether or not
to participate in the election, and whether to vote for a left-wing or a right-
wing party. Full details of the questionnaire are given in Appendix A, where
Questions 18 and 19 measure the two voting decisions. The respondents in
the first survey were also asked to provide their telephone number or email
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address, so that we could contact them after the election to ask them whether
they had gone voting and, if so, which party they had voted for. We call
this group, which is interviewed twice, the survey group. The second survey
was performed on a fresh set of respondents briefly after the elections, using
a similar questionnaire, see Appendix A for details. We call this group the
control group.
The interviews in the survey and control groups were taken during various
train trips. An attractive aspect of this set-up is that most people have little
to do during their travel, so that many of them are willing to cooperate. We
tried our best to draw reasonably comparable samples in the survey and con-
trol groups. As far as personal characteristics like gender, age, education, and
income is concerned, both groups have roughly similar characteristics, see the
lower panel in the table at the end of Appendix A for details. In total, 129
respondents answered all required questions, 62 in the survey group and 67 in
the control group.
Because of the relatively small sample sizes, we decided to simplify the
(open) answers to several questions on party choice by aggregating them into
three categories: ‘left-wing’ (three parties), ‘right-wing’ (also three parties),
and ‘no vote’. Actually, the last category also contains a few very small parties
that are not easily placed on the left-right political scale, but the non-voters
form the vast majority in this category. As an example, we consider the ques-
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tion regarding the actual vote at the March 2007 election. For this question,
the third choice category consists of 72 people, 66 of whom did not vote and
only 6 of whom voted for small parties. Further, 30 respondents voted for
left-wing parties and 27 for right-wing parties.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
The questionnaire consists of 19 questions in the survey group and of 17 ques-
tions in the control group, see Appendix A. As we will discuss in Section 4,
only a subset of nine variables will be used in our analysis. These variables
are listed in the upper panel of the table at the end of Appendix A, to which
we refer for details on the variable names, their meaning, and their relation to
the survey questions.
Table 1 shows the sample mean of the variables, for the full data set as well
as for the sub-samples within the survey and control groups. We mention some
aspects of interest. The expressed intention to vote for the March 2007 election
is 60% in the survey group, and in reality 58% made their vote in this group,
as compared to only 40% in the control group. The two groups also differ in
their participation in past elections in 2003, with values of 47% in the survey
group and 27% in the control group. One reason for the lower participation in
2003 is that some of the younger respondents were not yet allowed to vote in
2003. The survey and control groups are roughly comparable in their average
left-right position in the political spectrum and in the percentage of people
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having a mortgage, although the survey group is a bit more left oriented than
the control group. As compared to the target population, part-time workers
are somewhat over-represented in the sample, especially in the survey sample.
The past and current voting behavior are displayed in more detail in Table
2. This shows that about 30% of the past non-voters do vote now, whereas
about 15% of the past voters do not vote now. A more detailed analysis shows
that the step from past-non-voter to current voter is made more easily in the
survey group (36%) than in the control group (25%). This result is possibly
due to survey effects. Of the 24 past non-voters who do vote now, 12 are in the
survey group, with a left-right division of 9-3, and also 12 are in the control
group (4-4, while 4 other votes are on small parties). Of the 39 past voters
who vote also now, the left-right division in the survey group is 13-10 and in
the control group 4-10.
Table 3 shows bivariate sample correlations between the variables, neglect-
ing their discrete nature. For our later analysis, it is of particular importance
to find factors that have an effect on the voting intention and on the right-left
position in the political spectrum, especially in the survey group. The vot-
ing intention is most strongly related to the opinion on the importance of the
election and to past activity at elections, as expected. The large correlation
with active participation at the March 2007 election does also not come as a
surprise. The position in the political spectrum is most strongly related to
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past voting preferences, as expected. Another important factor is whether one
has a part-time job or not. Part-timers position themselves, on average, more
to the left as compared to fulltime workers or people who do not work.
3 Models
3.1 Voting participation model
The individual decision whether or not to participate in the elections (survey
Question 18, see Appendix A) is modelled by means of a binary choice model.
We assume that each individual has a latent intention to vote, denoted by LI,
which differs across individuals but which is assumed to be constant for each
individual over the considered time period. The actual decision whether to
participate or not depends on LI as well as on other factors that are unobserved
and that are represented by a random term ε. This random term varies across
individuals and it may also vary over time for each individual. The resulting
intention to participate is modelled as
B∗ = α + βLI + ε,
where α and β are unknown parameters with β > 0. In order to incorporate
possible survey effects, we extend the approach developed by Chandon et al
(2005) for regression models to the case of binary choice models, see also Heij
and Franses (2006). Let the values of (α, β) be (α1, β1) in the control group
and (α1 + α2, β1 + β2) in the survey group, so that α2 and β2 measure the
survey effect. Further, let S be a dummy variable, with value S = 1 in the
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survey group and S = 0 in the control group. Then the voting intention model
for the combined survey and control group can be expressed as
B∗ = α1 + β1LI + α2S + β2(LI · S) + ε. (1)
The actual participation decision is denoted by the binary variable B, with
value B = 1 if the individual does vote and B = 0 if not. We use a binary
choice model for this decision. That is, an individual does vote if and only
if the intention is non-negative, so that B = 1 if and only if B∗ ≥ 0. More
precisely, we employ the probit model that is based on the assumption that
the random term ε has the standard normal distribution. Let Φ denote the
corresponding cumulative distribution function, then the probability to vote
is given by
P (B = 1) = Φ(α1 + β1LI + α2S + β2(LI · S)). (2)
To make this operational, we need to model the unobserved latent intention
LI in terms of observed variables. For this purpose, we follow Chandon et
al (2005) again, where the latent intention is measured in the survey group
but not in the control group. This is precisely the situation relevant for our
analysis. Respondents in the survey group were asked to specify their intention
to vote at the upcoming elections (survey Question 9, see Appendix A, with
answers on a seven-point scale ranging from ‘certainly not’ to ‘yes, for sure’).
However, this question was not posed in the control group, because these
respondents were only interviewed after the elections had taken place. This
is because, after the elections, respondents will tend to have a highly biased
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recollection of their prior intentions. The measured intention in the survey
group is denoted by MI. It may differ from the latent intention LI because
of errors that are due to the measurement process, so that
MI = LI + δ, (3)
where δ denotes the measurement error. To obtain an estimate of LI for the
control group, we follow Chandon et al (2005) again. The measured intention
MI in the survey group is assumed to be related to a set of other variables that
are also available in the control group. Let Z denote the vector of variables
included to explain MI, then the linear model for MI is given by
MI = Zγ + η, (4)
where γ is a set of parameters and η is an error term. Estimates of γ, denoted
by γ̂, can be obtained by a regression using data in the survey group. In the
control group, with known scores for the variables Z, the intention to partici-
pate is then estimated by Zγ̂.
Summarizing the above, the probability to vote is given by equation (2).
The unobserved latent intention LI is replaced byMI in the survey group and
by Zγ̂ in the control group, where γ̂ is obtained by regression in (4) for the
data of the survey group. The parameters (α1, β1, α2, β2) of the resulting probit
model (2) are estimated by maximum likelihood. The survey effect on voter
participation can then be computed as P (B = 1|S = 1) − P (B = 1|S = 0),
that is, the increase in the probability to vote that is due to the survey. For a
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given level of intention LI, this effect is equal to
Φ(α1 + α2 + (β1 + β2)LI) − Φ(α1 + β1LI). (5)
It is shown in Heij and Franses (2006) that this method provides consistent
estimates only if the measurement errors δ in (3) are zero. Otherwise the
method is inconsistent, that is, the estimates of the parameters (α1, β1, α2, β2)
remain biased even in very large samples. The reason for this is the following.
By substituting (3) into (1) for the survey group, we obtain
B∗ = α1 + α2 + (β1 + β2)MI + (ε− β1δ − β2δS).
In this equation, the explanatory variable MI = LI + δ is correlated with
the composite error ε− β1δ − β2δS, because of the common error component
δ in both terms. Stated technically, the explanatory variable is endogenous
if δ is non-zero, and standard estimation procedures are no longer consistent.
This can be solved in a rather straightforward way by using the method of
Rivers and Vuong (1988), see also Wooldridge (2002). As is explained in
Heij and Franses (2006), the solution consists of adding the residuals e of the
regression in (4) to the probit model (2) for the survey group. More precisely,
in the presence of measurement errors, consistent estimates of the parameters
(α1, β1, α2, β2) are obtained as follows. In the control group, estimate the
probit model
P (B = 1) = Φ(α1 + β1Zγ̂). (6)
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In the survey group, estimate the probit model
P (B = 1) = Φ(α3 + β3MI + θe). (7)
Then α2 and β2 are estimated by using α2 = α3 − α1 and β2 = β3 − β1, after
applying an appropriate scale transformation of the estimates of α3 and β3.
We refer to Heij and Franses (2006) for further details. A test for the signifi-
cance of the measurement errors is given by the t-test on the parameter θ in (7).
In our application in Section 4.1, we will see that the measurement errors
are not significant at the 5% level (with a P-value of 0.08). For this reason,
we will not pay any further attention to measurement errors in this paper, but
the results after correction for measurement errors are available on request for
readers interested in this matter. We mention that correction for measurement
errors results in even somewhat larger survey effects than the ones reported in
Section 4, but the overall picture remains very much unaffected.
We conclude by stating the required estimation steps.
(a) Estimate γ̂ by regression in (4 )for the survey group, with residuals e.
(b) Estimate (7) by probit for the survey group.
(c) If θ is not significant, then estimate (2) by probit for the combined survey
and control group, replacing LI by Zγ̂. If θ is significant, then estimate (6) by
probit for the control group and re-scale the estimates of (7) in (b) to estimate
(α2, β2).
13
3.2 Party choice model
As was discussed in Section 2.1, the party choice options are aggregated be-
cause of the relatively small number of observations and the large number
of parties involved in the elections. We distinguish two types of vote: left-
wing (Labor, Socialist, and Green Left parties) and right-wing (Christian
Democrats, Liberals, and Christian Union). A third option is not to vote,
or to vote for one of the smaller parties, see Section 2.1 for further details.
Then each individual has to choose among these three options, and we wish
to investigate the possible existence of survey effects on this decision. For this
purpose, we extend the binary model of the previous section to this multino-
mial setting.
The decision variable is denoted by M , with M = 0 for ‘no vote or vote
for small party’, M = 1 for ‘vote on right-wing party’, and M = 2 for ‘vote on
left-wing party’. The values 0, 1 and 2 are just labels and do not correspond
to any ordering. In multinomial choice models, one option is chosen as bench-
mark and the intentions to choose for one of the other options is expressed
in terms of a latent variable. Here we choose option 0 as benchmark, and
the latent intention to choose for the other options is denoted by LI. This
intention is measured to some extent in the survey group, as respondents are
asked to position themselves on a seven-point scale from left to right in the
political spectrum. The measured intention is denoted by MI. The question
on the position in the political spectrum is also asked in the control group,
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but the answers in this group may give a biased picture of their position be-
fore the elections. This is because the respondents in the control group were
interviewed only after the elections, and it may well be that their choice at
the elections has affected their subjective evaluation of the political position
they had before the elections. Therefore, we choose to follow a similar proce-
dure as in the previous section. The measured intention in the survey group
is related to a set of variables Z by (4), where Z consists of variables that are
also measured in the control group and that are not influenced by the decision
made at the elections. Of course, the specific set of variables may differ here
from the one chosen in the binary participation model of the previous section.
The estimated intention in the survey and control groups is then given by Zγ̂,
where γ̂ is obtained by regression in (4) for the survey group.
With this set-up, we can in principle follow a similar estimation procedure
as before, now with the multinomial probit model instead of the binary probit
model. However, a numerically much simpler method is to use the multinomial
logit model, see, for instance, Franses and Paap (2001). In terms of the latent
intention LI, the choice probabilities for each of the three options are modelled
by the following equations, where ‘exp(x)’ denotes the exponential function ex.
P (M = 0) =
1
1 + exp(α1 + β1LI) + exp(α2 + β2LI)
P (M = 1) =
exp(α1 + β1LI)
1 + exp(α1 + β1LI) + exp(α2 + β2LI)
(8)
P (M = 2) =
exp(α2 + β2LI)
1 + exp(α1 + β1LI) + exp(α2 + β2LI)
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To incorporate possible survey effects, the parameters α1, β1, α2 and β2 can
be chosen to be different for both groups. The multinomial logit model for the
combined survey and control groups then has eight parameters, which can be
estimated by maximum likelihood after replacing the unobserved variable LI
by the fitted intentions Zγ̂. The survey effects can be evaluated by comparing
the choice probabilities P (M = j) (with j = 0, 1, 2) for the survey and control
groups, for given intention level LI.
We conclude by listing the required estimation steps.
(a) Estimate γ̂ by regression in (4) for the survey group.
(b) Estimate the parameters of the multinomial logit model (8), replacing LI
by Zγ̂ and using different sets of parameters for the survey and control groups.
4 Results
4.1 Voting participation
We estimate the binary decision whether or not to vote by means of the three-
step methodology described at the end of Section 3.1. First we specify the
regression equation (4) for the survey group, which relates the expressed vot-
ing intentions to a set of explanatory variables. The available data information
consists of the answers of 62 respondents on a set of 17 questions, see Appendix
A. The voting intention MI is measured by Question 9, asking whether the
respondent intends to vote at the upcoming elections. The corresponding vari-
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able is denoted by ‘VOTE−INTENTION’, with seven possible scores ranging
from 1/7 (for the answer ‘certainly not’) to 7/7 = 1 (for ‘yes, for sure’). As was
discussed in Section 2.2, this intention is most strongly related to the opinion
on the importance of the elections (Question 3, ‘VOTE−IMPORTANT’) and
to the past activity at elections (Questions 6 and 7, ‘PAST−VOTE’), see Ta-
ble 3. These two variables are therefore chosen as explanatory variables. We
tested for the additional explanatory power of further variables by following
the stepwise forward selection method. That is, first we search for the most
significant variable (as measured by the t-value), and we continue until no
additional variables are significant anymore. It turned out that the mortgage
variable (Question 15, ‘MORTGAGE’) is the most significant extra variable
and that no other variables add significantly anymore (at the 5% significance
level). The resulting regression relation (4) is given by
V−INT = −0.072+0.140×V−IMP+0.306×PAST−V−0.142×MOR+e, (9)
where e denotes the residual term of this equation. We used abbreviations for
the variable names, and we refer to Table 4 for further details. As expected,
the opinion on the importance of the elections and the past voting activity
both have a positive effect on the voting intention. People with a mortgage
for their own house are relatively less inclined to vote. This can be due to the
fact that the elections are regional, whereas the decisions on tax policies for
own houses are decided at the national level and on the city level.
The second step is to estimate the probit model (7) for the survey group.
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The explained variable is the actual decision whether to vote or not, as mea-
sured by Question 18. This variable is denoted by ‘VOTE−ACTUAL’, with
value 1 if the respondent did vote and 0 if not. The explanatory variable is
the vote intention. As is explained in Section 3.1, the residuals e of (4) are
added as an additional regressor to account for possible measurement errors
in the intention variable. The estimated probit equation (7) is given by
P (V−ACT = 1) = Φ
(
−1.612 + 3.517× V−INT− 1.817× e
)
. (10)
The coefficient of e has standard error 1.045, giving a P-value of 0.082. This
means that the measurement errors are not significant (at the 5% level), so
that the model can be estimated without taking this issue into account. This
leads us to the third and final step of the estimation methodology described
at the end of Section 3.1. That is, the probit model (2) is estimated for the
combined survey and control group, replacing LI by the fitted values of (9).
These fitted measured intentions are denoted by ‘FMI’. The value of FMI for
each respondent is computed by the formula on the right-hand-side of (9), by
substituting the scores of the respondent on the variables V−IMP, PAST−V,
and MOR. The resulting estimated probit model is as follows, where S is the
survey dummy variable with value 1 for respondents in the survey group and
value 0 for respondents in the control group.
P (V−ACT = 1) = Φ
(
−1.842+ 3.175×FMI+0.193×S +0.026× (FMI ·S)
)
.
(11)
As expected, the probability to vote is larger for respondents with a larger
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intention to vote. The survey effects are positive, as the constant term (-1.842
+ 0.193 = -1.649) and the slope coefficient (3.175 + 0.026 = 3.201) in the
survey group are both larger than in the control group. Such effects are in line
with findings in a previous study of Dutch elections by Voogt (2004). Note,
however, that the survey effects are not significant, see Table 5 for further
details. This finding is probably due to the relatively small sample sizes, with
62 respondents in the survey group (36 of whom vote) and 67 respondents in
the control group (27 of whom vote).
For a given intention level FMI, the probability to vote can be computed
from (11), both for the survey group and for the control group. The voting
intention is measured on a seven-point scale running from 1/7 to 7/7=1, and
Table 6 shows the estimated voting probabilities for the two groups as well
as the corresponding survey effects. The survey effects are positive for all
intention levels. The effects are the largest (about 6-8%) for people with
median intention levels (3/7 - 6/7) and the smallest (about 2-4%) at extreme
intention levels (1/7, 2/7, and 7/7). This is as expected, as people with strong
(positive or negative) intentions to vote will be affected less by the survey than
people who are very much in doubt whether they will vote or not.
4.2 Party choice
In Section 3.2, we described a two-step methodology to model the multinomial
decision whether not to vote (option 0), to vote for a right-wing party (option
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1), or to vote for a left-wing party (option 2). The first step consists of a
regression in (4) for the survey group. Here the explained variable MI is
the intention to vote for a left-wing or right-wing party, and Z consists of
a set of variables driving this intention. The intention MI is measured by
Question 8, asking the respondent to indicate his or her position in the political
spectrum. The corresponding variable is denoted by ‘RL−POSITION’, with
seven possible scores ranging from 1 (far left) to 7 (far right). As was discussed
in Section 2.2, this self-positioning variable is most strongly related to the past
voting behavior (Questions 6 and 7, ‘PAST−LEFT’ and ‘PAST−RIGHT’). As
in the previous section, additional explanatory variables are chosen by step-
wise forward selection. This results in a single added variable, indicating
whether the respondent has a part-time job (between 12 and 34 hours per
week) or not (fulltime job, no job, or a job for less than 12 hours a week).
The score on this variable is obtained from Question 12 and is denoted by
JOBPART, with value 1 if the respondent has a part-time job and 0 otherwise.
The resulting regression relation (4) is given by
RL−POS = 3.705+1.650×PAST−R− 1.166×PAST−L− 0.655×JOBPART.
(12)
We used abbreviations for some of the variable names, and we refer to Table 7
for further details. The coefficients of the two variables related to past voting
behavior have the expected signs, as lower scores on RL−POS correspond to
political positions further to the left. Further, respondents having a part-time
job take, on average, political positions that are relatively more to the left.
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The second step is to estimate the multinomial logit model (8), replacing
LI by the fitted values FMI of (4) and using different sets of parameters for the
survey and control groups. For each respondent, the fitted political position
FMI is computed by the formula on the right-hand-side of (12), by substituting
the scores on the variables PAST−R, PAST−L, and JOBPART. This gives the
following multinomial models for the survey and control groups:
P (M = 0) =
1
1 + eR + eL
,
P (M = 1) =
eR
1 + eR + eL
, P (M = 2) =
eL
1 + eR + eL
, (13)
where R and L are given by the equations
survey : R = −7.547 + 1.647× FMI, L = 6.301− 2.043× FMI,
control : R = −12.865 + 3.043× FMI, L = 6.669− 2.658× FMI.
Seven out of the eight coefficients are significant at the 5% level, and we refer
to Table 8 for further details. The probability of a right-wing vote (M = 1)
increases for larger values of R, and the probability of a left-wing vote (M = 2)
increases for larger values of L. As larger values of FMI correspond to a po-
sition more to the right, the positive sign of FMI in the equations for R and
the negative sign of FMI in the equations for L are as expected.
To evaluate the magnitude of survey effects on party choice, we compare
the probabilities of each voting option for the survey and control groups. First
of all, we test for the significance of the differences between the four coeffi-
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cients in the survey group and the four corresponding coefficients of the control
group. These differences are not significant at the 5% significance level (the
Likelihood Ratio test for the four coefficient restrictions has a P-value of 0.l2).
This lack of significance is again due to the relatively small sample sizes in our
study.
Table 9 compares the choice probabilities for the seven possible values of
the right-left position in the political spectrum, ranging from 1 (far left) to 7
(far right). As expected, the vote preference (left or right) is strongly related
to the position in the political spectrum. The survey effects are the strongest
(32 percent points) for the probability that a moderately left-wing oriented
person (political score 3) will vote on a left-wing party instead of deciding
not to vote. The survey also affects people who take a moderately right-wing
position (political score 5), as their probability to choose not to vote increases
considerably (by 25 percent points). That is, the survey seems to motivate
left-wing people who otherwise would not have participated in the elections.
The effect is opposite for right-wing people, as they tend to be discouraged
by the survey to participate. Further, the effects are strongest for people with
a moderate political position, and the effects are small at both ends of the
political spectrum.
It is of evident interest to use these results to get an indication of the
overall bias that may be expected from surveys based on a random sample.
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Table 10 summarizes the survey effects for the six types of people that can
be distinguished with regard to the three explanatory variables in our polit-
ical orientation model (12). The three variables in this model are all binary,
giving a total of eight combinations. However, two of these combinations are
impossible, as a past left-wing vote excludes a past right-wing vote and vice
versa. For each of the six types of people, the political orientation FMI can
be computed from equation (12). The survey effects can then be computed
from equation (13). Finally, the overall bias can be estimated by taking the
weighted average of the survey effects, with weights equal to the proportion
of voters in each of the six categories. The resulting average survey effects
are shown in the bottom row of Table 10. Here we used the six proportions
that apply for our combined survey and control samples. The results are as
follows. The probability not to vote decreases by 14%, from 61% to 47%. The
probability to vote for a left-wing party increases by 17%, from 16% to 33%.
Finally, the probability to vote for a right-wing party decreases by 3%, from
23% to 20%.
Summarizing, we find evidence for the potential danger that pre-election
opinion polls over-estimate the percentage of votes for left-wing parties if the
polls are not corrected for survey effects. Our analysis indicates that this
kind of survey bias may be substantial. This provides a possible explanation
for recent experiences of polling agencies that consistently over-estimated the
share of left-wing parties.
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4.3 Limitations and discussion
The results presented above should be interpreted with some caution. Our
results are based on the relatively small sample of 129 people who partici-
pated in this study. In order to extrapolate this to the Dutch population, a
crucial question is whether our sample is sufficiently representative for this
population, or even better, for the samples that are used by agencies involved
in producing political polls.
The survey effects could not be estimated with great precision because
of the small sample size. Further, the proportions of the six types of peo-
ple in our survey do not correspond very well with the actual proportions in
the Dutch society. This is because the data were collected during train trips.
Train travellers are not fully representative of society, and furthermore it was
not possible to interview people during peak hours as trains tend to be overly
crowded at that time. This has caused some over-representation of part-time
workers, as their share in the sample is 37% as compared to about 20% in the
target population of people who are allowed to vote. Another obstacle in the
survey group was that some people were not willing to provide us with their
phone number or email address, which may cause a selective non-response bias
in this group.
We conjecture that the (positive) survey effect on the probability to vote
for a left-wing party is over-estimated, whereas the (negative) effect to vote
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on a right-wing party is estimated imprecisely, with the possibility that this
effect can actually be positive. Our finding that especially left-wing people
can be motivated to participate in voting by being subjected to a survey is in
line with previous findings. For instance, weather conditions on the election
day seem to have a stronger impact on left-wing people than on right-wing
people. In general, right-wing people tend to be more determined than left-
wing people to participate in elections, so that positive and negative stimuli
have a stronger effect on left-wing people. One of the possible explanations is
a different age distribution for both wings, as right-wing people are on average
somewhat older and many of them have known times when voting was still
obligatory.
5 Conclusion
The outcomes of pre-election polls may be biased for several reasons, an im-
portant one being that the survey itself may change the behavior of surveyed
people. We applied discrete choice models to evaluate the magnitude of survey
effects on voting behavior. The data are obtained for two groups: a survey
group that is interviewed both before and after the elections, and a control
group that is surveyed only after the elections. Respondents in the latter group
can not be influenced in their voting behavior anymore, whereas respondents
in the survey group can be affected by the pre-election survey. By comparing
the voting behavior in both groups, we obtain estimates of the involved survey
effects.
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As concerns the voter turnout, the empirical results indicate positive sur-
vey effects. This means that surveyed people are, on average, more likely to go
voting than non-surveyed people. To prevent this upward bias, voter turnout
predictions based on pre-election polls must be corrected downwards. The re-
quired correction in our application ranges from about eight percent points for
people with moderate prior inclination to vote to about two percent points for
people with a very low inclination to vote. Further, as concerns party choice,
left-wing voters are more strongly influenced by the survey than right-wing
voters are. That is, the probability that left-wing oriented people go voting
is increased considerably by being exposed to the pre-election survey, whereas
this effect is much smaller for right-wing oriented people. As a consequence,
correction for survey effects is also needed to prevent overestimation of the
share of votes for left-wing parties. This may provide a possible explanation
for recently observed biases in opinion polls in The Netherlands, where the
election forecasts of all three major agencies overestimated the share of left-
wing parties by three to four percent points.
An evident limitation of our study is that the results are based on rela-
tively small samples. The survey sample contains 62 respondents, 36 of whom
went voting, and the control sample consists of 67 people, 27 of whom went
voting. The above mentioned effects on voter turnout and party choice are
found to be quite consistent all over the sample, but the effects are not highly
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significant. A field study of a larger scale could shed more light on the precise
magnitude of the involved survey effects, and it would also give the oppor-
tunity to disaggregate the party choice beyond the currently employed rough
left-right division.
In order to apply the required corrections for survey effects in future fore-
casts, more experience should first be gained by comparing the behavior of
surveyed and non-surveyed people by means of the methodology proposed in
this paper. This will provide more reliable estimates of the required correction
factors, which can then be applied to correct opinion poll responses for survey
effects to get more accurate forecasts of the actual election outcomes.
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A Questionnaire and List of Variables
In the survey group, the following 17 questions were posed before the regional
elections took place (the answer options are in parentheses).
Q1 Are you interested in politics and political decision making? (7-point scale,
from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much)
Q2 Please express your opinion on the following statement: ‘It is everyone’s
duty to vote’. (7-point scale, from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = fully agree)
Q3 What is your opinion, is voting for the Provincial States important?
(7-point scale, 1 = not at all to 7 = very much)
Q4 Did you vote at the last national elections in 2006? (yes, no and was
not allowed to vote, no but was allowed to vote)
Q5 For which party did you vote at the last national elections in 2006?
(open answer)
Q6 Did you vote at the previous regional elections in 2003? (yes, no and
was not allowed to vote, no but was allowed to vote)
Q7 For which party did you vote at the previous regional elections in 2003?
(open answer)
Q8 If you had to position yourself in the political spectrum, where would
that be? (7-point scale, from 1 = left to 7 = right)
Q9 Do you intend to vote at the upcoming regional elections? (7-point
scale, from 1 = certainly not to 7 = yes, for sure)
Q10 Which party are you likely going to vote for at the upcoming regional
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elections? (multiple choice, including the eight major parties as well as the
options ‘I do prefer not to tell’, ‘ I do not know yet’ and ‘I will certainly not
go voting’)
Q11 Please express the importance that you assign to each of the following
themes: Education, Economics and Finance, Environment, Traffic and Trans-
port, Security, Housing, Health and Sport (7-point scale for each theme, from
1 = not at all to 7 = very much)
Q12 Please indicate whether you have a job. (yes fulltime, yes part-time,
no)
Q13 Please indicate the net income per month of your household. (6 op-
tions, from below 400 euro to above 4000 euro)
Q14 Please state the highest education level that you completed. (4 options,
from below middle education to university degree)
Q15 Do you have a mortgage? (yes, no)
Q16 Please fill in your age. (open answer)
Q17 Please fill in your gender. (male, female)
In the survey group, the following two questions were posed after the regional
elections had taken place.
Q18 Did you go voting at the regional elections of 2007? (yes, no)
Q19 For which party did you vote for at the regional elections of 2007?
(multiple choice, including the eight major parties as well as the option ‘I
prefer not to tell’)
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In the control group, questions Q1 - Q8 and Q11 - Q19 were posed after the
regional elections had taken place.
For each variable that is used in the paper, the list below shows the variable
name, the meaning of the variable, the question from which the scores on
the variable are derived, and some further information. The lower part shows
some variables that are not used in the analysis but that provide background
information on the sample.
Name Meaning Q Information
JOBPART part-time job Q12 12 to 34 hours per week
MORTGAGE mortgage own house Q15
PAST−LEFT past left-wing Q6,7 Green Left, Labor, Socialist
PAST−RIGHT past right-wing Q6,7 Chr.Democrats, Chr.Union, Liberal
PAST−VOTE active previous Q6,7 left-wing or right-wing vote
RL−POSITION right-left Q8
VOTE−ACTUAL active current Q18,19 left-wing or right-wing vote
VOTE−IMPORTANT elections important Q3
VOTE−INTENTION voting intention Q9
Income Q13 av. 1800 euro (survey and control)
Education Q14 higher: 55% (survey), 40% (control)
Age Q16 av. 36 (survey), 33 (control)
Gender Q17 male: 57% (survey), 48% (control)
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